An employee of JHT Holdings, Inc., a trucking company, was responsible for resolving roadway accident claims

An employee of JHT Holdings, Inc., a trucking company, was responsible for resolving roadway accident claims under $25,000. The employee created fake accident claims and wrote settlement checks of between $5,000 and $25,000 to friends or acquaintances acting as phony “victims.” One friend recruited subordinates at his place of work to cash some of the checks. Beyond this, the JHT employee also recruited lawyers, who he paid to represent both the trucking company and the fake victims in the bogus accident settlements. When the lawyers cashed the checks, they allegedly split the money with the corrupt JHT employee. This fraud went undetected for two years.


Why would it take so long to discover such a fraud?


Answer:
This is an example of a fraud with significant collusion. Frauds that are perpetrated with multiple parties in different positions of control make detecting fraud more
difficult. In this case, the fraud began with an employee responsible for authorizing claim payments. This is a sensitive position because his decisions would initiate payments. However, claims would need to be authorized and verified before payment would be made. Knowing this, the employee made sure each claim had a phony “victim.” Thus, there was a verifiable story behind each claim. Only by tracking physical evidence of the accident could it be discovered that the claim was fictitious. However, the very nature of the process was to resolve small claims quickly without excessive control. Lastly, corrupt lawyers were brought into the fraud to act as attorneys for the claimants. This gave the claims even more credibility. In actuality, the lawyers had done legitimate business with the trucking company, so all appeared normal. This fraud was discovered when the fraudulent employee’s bank noticed irregularities in his bank account and notified authorities. As the saying goes, “Follow the money!” As a side note, the corrupt claims
administrator fell into this behavior due to gambling problems.





The mailroom employees send all remittances and remittance advices to the cashier. The cashier deposits the cash in the bank and forwards the remittance advices and duplicate deposit slips to the Accounting Department.

a. Indicate the weak link in internal control in the handling of cash receipts.
b. How can the weakness be corrected?


Answer:
a. The remittance advices should not be sent to the cashier.
b. The remittance advices should be sent directly to the Accounting Department by the mailroom.